5: Dobby K-4 (no date) 1950 AL1 Southeast Asia
Burma AP1

were almost exclusively Indian in personnel. In this way the multiplicity of peoples already in Burma was complicated by commercialisation and urbanisation based on Indians.

How the early Burmese pioneers of the newly opened rice areas of the deltas gradually lost their independent smallholdings and became tenant farmers has already been described. To complicate the issue, the hands into which the mortgaged lands fell were Indian, mostly of the Chettyar Indians, who became owners of half the Delta's agricultural lands by 1931. They were foreign, absentee non-agricultural landowners, which added to the Burmese farmers' economic difficulties the passion of racial animosity which had scarcely arisen while the immigration of foreigners was confined to the temporary agricultural labourer type. Thus, the Irrawaddy Delta was not only foreign to Burma in its agricultural system of cash crops; it was more concerned with overseas interests and overseas trade. The port of Rangoon was almost the sole entry and exit of the country; land on the Delta was largely in the hands of foreign Indian owners who encouraged still further cultivation by compatriot Indian labourers. This split Burma into the centripetal zone, the Dry Zone, essentially Burmese and poor, and the centrifugal zone, the wealthy Irrawaddy Delta and Rangoon, essentially foreign and mainly Indian, an exit rather than a nucleus of Burma. While, then, Burma's earlier history was one of a dead-end to Mongoloid migrations, the relative emptiness of the new most fertile part of the country made it a magnet for the impoverished, loose-footed peoples of congested eastern India.

Urban Centres

Only two places, Rangoon and Mandalay, can be called big towns; of the others, only Moulmein, Bassein and Akyab contain over 40,000 people. Towns may be classified as minor ports and estuarial rice centres, such as Akyab, Bassein, Moulmein and Tavoy. In addition there are river ports in a string from Henzada to Bhamo, lining the great Irrawaddy waterway, which is commercially navigable to 900 miles inland. Many small towns like Myingyan have the rural industries of oil pressing and cotton ginning. Yenangyaung and Namtu are garish and makeshift oil and mining towns. The railway and administration centres often have a long history, as is the case with Pegu, Shwebo and Toungoo. All these places have been described by Spate as little more

5: Dobby K-4 (no date) 1950 AL1 Southeast Asia
Burma AP1

162 369 361

than overgrown villages, sprawling vaguely round a few buildings often of the "corrugated iron" period; they were pioneering settlements in character, whatever their history.

Rangoon (half a million inhabitants in 1941) stands at a point where converge the Irrawaddy waterways, an overland route to the foothills of the Pegu Yoma and overseas steamship routes. Itself accessible by ocean-going steamers, Rangoon thus commands the approaches to Burma by both the Sittang and Irrawaddy waterways and valleys, as well as along the Pegu Yoma, which is a well-drained land route followed today by the railway. The town has the rectangular pattern common in pioneer towns and it had no local significance until external trade developed over the last century or so. Its prewar aspect was distinctly Indian though Burmanisation of the administration has gone on rapidly since Burmese governments were established there. In its function as chief port, Rangoon has handled over 4-5th of the country's external trade and been the gathering point of great numbers of Indian migrants with a seasonal volume of passenger traffic to and from India, which totalled over half a million annually for the period 1921–31. Overseas shipping and interests gave Rangoon a cosmopolitan air, the most modern and westernised town in the country. Though the port suffered to some extent by being off the general run of major ocean-going steamers, its international significance was increased when it became a halt on transcontinental airlines linking it to India and Europe, Bangkok and the Far East, and to Singapore and Australia. About one-third of a million Chinese had settled in the different ports of Lower Burma as traders, more resident than migrant. For a time the Rangoon-Lashio-Kunming route to wartime China produced a feverish activity among Chinese in Rangoon, but there is little postwar evidence that this route into inner China is likely to assume permanent value. There has arisen no serious movement to change the function of Rangoon as the administrative capital of Burma in its independence (1948). The city suffered more from war in the Far East than any other capital of Southeast Asia except Manila: its transport facilities were destroyed and this, together with the breakdown of internal organisation, paralysed trade which, despite greatly increased prices, was in 1946 valued at only 54 per cent of that in 1940.

[504]

Mandalay, historically associated with Burmese kings, is a much

5: Dobby K-4 (no date) 1950 AL1 Southeast Asia
Burma AP1

smaller and now war-scarred town which never ceased to be entirely Burmese in its tradition. It had less than 200,000 inhabitants, yet these had created a cultured and matured social atmosphere in the Oriental manner, with an elaborate and indigenous art, music and drama which was paralleled in few other parts of continental Southeast Asia, where pioneering has so far evolved little that is mature.

While the detailed geography of urban Burma will have suffered most from the two military campaigns fought through it in 1942 and 1944, the pattern of the countryside remains the same, with minimum effects on the subsistence farming areas of Central Burma and maximum effects in the commercialised deltaic fringes where not only has trading organisation been destroyed but also much of the migrant labour has ceased. The Indian population has changed considerably because over 600,000 Indians trekked through the Arakan Hills into Assam in 1942, a fact of special significance in the social and commercial structure of post-war Burma.

Regional Geography

Four relatively densely populated regions are the core of Burma's geography (Fig. 49):

1. *The Dry Zone*, whose dry climate, subsistence agriculture and exclusively Burmese tradition make it the most distinctive region, centring on Pagan and Mandalay. Its boundaries are partly the 40″ isohyet, emphasised by sharp marginal relief changes.
2. *The Lower Burma deltas*—where, centring on the Irrawaddy Delta, and spreading through the Sittang Delta, a commercialised agriculture based on rice, foreign trade and foreign labour has created a composite non-Burmese region whose evolution has given Burma a second and powerful focal point, Rangoon.
3. *The Arakan deltaic coast*, a minor paddy-growing area and historic line of Indian approach to Inner Burma, with less population than (1) and (2). Sharply confined to seaboard by "Pacific type" mountain ranges inland, it has tended in the last half century to be related commercially to Bengal rather than to Burma.
4. *The Tenasserim Coast* is a highly varied region of ranges, fringed by small cultivated lowlands hedged in by mangrove swamps

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244 137 *na edulis* Ker), sweet potato (*Ipomoea batatas* Poir.), taro (*Colocasia esculenta* Schott), *Curcuma* species, Goa bean (*Psophocarpus tetragonolobus* DC.), bitter cucumber (*Momordica charantia* L.), snake gourd (*Trichosanthes anguina* L.), Lima bean (large) (*Phaseolus lunatus* L.), Goa potato (*Dioscorea aculeata* L.), wild yam (*Dioscorea hispida* Dennst.), and sweet yam (*Dioscorea alata* L.). The middle story contains taller-growing plants, such as cassava (*Manihot utilissima* Pohl), citrus varieties such as *Citrus nobilis* Lour. and *Citrus aurantifolia* Swingle, papaya (*Carica papaya* L.), banana (*Musa* species), rose apple (*Eugenia aquea* Burm.), and soursop (*Anona muricata* L.). The upper story is formed by tall fruit trees, such as coconut (*Cocos nucifera* L.), jackfruit (*Artocarpus integra* Merr.), sapodilla or chico (*Achras zapota* L.), pomelo (*Citrus maxima* Merr.), of which numerous forms, differing in size and color, are known in the Indies, *belinju* (*Gnetum gnemon* L.), mango (*Mangifera indica* L.), durian (*Durio zibethinus* Murr.), candlenut tree (*Aleurites moluccana* Willd.), tamarind (*Tamarindus indica* L.), *pete* (*Parkia speciosa* Hassk.), stinkbean tree (*Pithecellobium lobatum* Benth.), and *santol* (*Sandoricum koetjape* Merr.).

This list does not by any means include all the plants that appear in the gardens. The plants vary in number and type from region to region in accordance with differences in soil, climate (elevation), and the taste of the owners.

311 244 161 369 Estimates indicate that about 15 per cent of the cultivated land in Java and Madura is taken up by gardens. Unfortunately, there have been no detailed studies of garden culture outside of Java, although the products of the garden play an important role in the diet of all the peoples of Southeastern Asia. Terra, who compared garden culture in various districts of Java, found that the share of land allotted to gardens, together with the intensity of their cultivation, increases as the total amount of crop land per head decreases, down to the point where the average amount of crop land per head is only 0.15 hectare. Where the amount of land is even less than this the share of garden land decreases, although there is a tendency at first to increase the intensity of the garden culture. Close to the larger cities, the amount of crop land per person, together with the amount devoted to gardens and the intensity of the latter's cultivation, falls off to a minimum since the population here has supplementary sources of income.

With the development of a money economy appears a specialization that is directed toward the urban centers. There has always been some natural specialization inasmuch as some plants do not grow well everywhere. The coconut, for example, does best in the lowlands. But the new specialization depends not only upon such natural factors as soil and climate, but also upon economic factors such as marketing facilities and the development of communications. This specialization can be observed generally in Southeastern Asia.

146 244 Ochse and Terra found that in calories of food value the returns of the gardens proved to be slightly higher per hectare than those of the irri-

5: Dobby K-4 (no date) 1950 ALl Southeast Asia ALl

000 The dualisms and pluralities of Southeast Asia society are relatively modern, becoming emphatic only over the past three hundred years, but plural societies and changing values within the units have been apparent in their changing political patterns. First there were the inland political nuclei; the kingdoms of Middle Burma, Upper Siam, Inner Cambodia were matched among the islands by principalities set in the mountains of Sumatra and Java. Then came the little powers related more to the sea than to the land; the Sailendra kingdoms using the Malacca Strait as their bond and artery, the Majapahit sea kingdom whose territories in Borneo, Celebes, Java and South Sumatra may be thought of as footholds for a sailing people, fringing rather than entrenched in the islands (Fig. 113). At a later phase the move of power centres was to the lower rivers of the continental edge, to Lower Burma and Lower Siam. In these historic patterns of political units may be seen operating the influences and traditions of widely differing human types, one rooted in the land, coming overland, depending on agriculture for its welfare and power; the other of seafaring people, many kinds and grades of them, coming to the lands of Southeast Asia by water, relatively mobile on their seaways, fishing and trading through the seas, and always peripheral to the land.

Dual National Foci

• 369 184 177 631 In most of the constituent political units of Southeast Asia there is thus a split of interest (Fig. 117). Burma has a focus at Mandalay and a commercial-administrative focus at Rangoon; the Philippines has a dual nodality round Manila and round the Visayan Islands; Malaya, which has only recently acquired clear internal focus, has two centres of different interest, Kuala Lumpur and Singapore, the former exclusively peninsular, the latter as much involved with all Southeast Asia as with Malaya; Indochina has the double pull of the Tonkin (Hanoi) area and the Mekong Delta (Saigon); Java, its old internal focus at Jogjakarta, with Batavia acting as external point of attraction. Sumatra is in the strange position of having several inland nuclei plus the tendency to use Singapore as its outport and route to Batavia. Only Siam can claim to have no second focus, yet even there the channelling toward Bangkok is only natural for the Chao Praya Basin; the Korat Plateau topography leads human and commercial interests towards the Mekong and the border country towards the northwest was once focused on

5 Dobby K-4 (no date) 1950 ALI Southeast Asia ALI

the historic kingdoms at Chiengmai. Borneo is laid out so far entirely under centrifugal influences, complicated by the split into British and Dutch zonations.

If this "balkanisation" be true of the individual political units, it is equally strong in the region as a whole, except that the intersection of major seaways and airways tends to make an internal regional focus on Singapore, a tendency diminished by India's economic pull on Burma and South China's pull on the people, trade and foods of Siam and Indochina.

To some extent these dual foci to each territory have been stimulated by the arrival of Western trading systems which pulled in one direction while the traditional interests pull in another, yet in a sense all these political units have been created by colonial powers administering as a unit territories not previously politically unified or previously using the present boundaries. Spain and the United States enforced unity upon what is now the Philippines and in practice had continued difficulty in keeping Mindanao, for example, within the unit. France has imposed a uniformity and a certain coherence upon Indochina which was novel to the constituent units. Malaya as it exists today is a British political creation. Before the Dutch colonial period of the present century, all the islands of the East Indies had never been controlled as one whole.

Environment and States

The continental political units, Burma, Siam and Indochina in some ways may be likened to little Egypts—nucleations of people within attractive, fertile valleys protected in these cases by the nearly empty space of forests and mountains. The combination of natural encouragement and natural protection conditioned major civilisations in Egypt and in Mesopotamia at one phase in history and appears to be equally encouraging in this tropical setting except for one difference, that although this environment on the southeastern fringe of Asia certainly suited the growth of states, its protective isolation was incomplete. In the north the growing riverine states were exposed to intruders. Thus in these riverside nurseries, states were environmentally encouraged to grow in a setting attractive as breeding grounds for nations, though the environment was not sufficiently isolating nor sufficiently protective to enable the nascent states to persist. So far as the main islands were concerned, on our maps they appear as more emphatic units

5: Dobby K-4 (no date) 1950 ALl Southeast Asia ALl

than their elongated forms, difficult interiors and cliffed, marsh or forest edges in fact justify. Rarely has any one of the major islands been the locale of a single people singly governed, homogeneous and integrated into an island-state. These large islands have been dispersive and fragmentive to the peoples in them.

Postwar Nationalism

The postwar effusion of nationalism in Southeast Asia is thus a paradox. It is a nationalism of plural societies and substantial minorities, without homogeneity inside the states, and without a nation, as understood in Europe, and very much a culmination of the insecurity and uncertainty produced by the divergent influences which have long been at work, breaking down old social integrations and their warm, human associations, substituting for them nothing but commerce and the new myth "economic man," cold, inexorable and not adequately or fully integrated with Southeast Asia people and their setting.

The devolution of Southeast Asia from colonial into nationalist units takes place at no propitious time. The cultivation of rice has been predatory, the accumulated effects of which are now showing in diminishing yields; new paddylands before the war were ceasing to be so easily available and the war threw a large proportion of the old lands out of cultivation. Rubber has found a competitor in synthetic rubber, and its production may repeat the history of sugar. Tin recovers from the war slowly because equipment has been lost. Plantation crops have lost labour, markets and opportunities. Yet Southeast Asia is still increasing its people faster than the world average. Its increase, however, has gone on at a slower rate in the already congested areas and at a faster rate in what had been the emptier areas of South Sumatra (with Javanese migrants), in Mindanao (with Filipinos), in Johore (by Chinese immigrants), as well as in Laos, Dutch Borneo and Inner Siam, by local increases. Thus Southeast Asia has been filling up, though there is little prospect yet of an even distribution.

Devolution

The Southeast Asia population is expanding now as the trade systems which provided its first impetus to expansion shrink and lose coherence. The atmosphere is one of relinquishing colonies, but under circumstances when they are involved in an international

162
369
361

Standards for defining urban populations differ, but it can be assumed safely that no more than 15 per cent of the 175 million people of Southeast Asia belong in an urban category.[2] In contrast, in the United States, with a population somewhat smaller than that of Southeast Asia as a whole, over 64 per cent of the population is classified as urban.

Estimates for 1952 indicate only 30 cities or urban agglomerations with populations of 100,000 or more.[3] In the United States, however, there are 160 such urban areas; in the Soviet Union, with a population of 200 millions, there are about 120; and in Japan, with one-half the population of Southeast Asia, there are 64. In Southeast Asia only an estimated 7 per cent of the total population lives in cities of 100,000 or more; less in Burma, Indochina, Thailand, and Indonesia; somewhat more in the Philippines. Only Malaya, including Singapore, departs

[1] Revised from a paper read before the Far Eastern Association in Spring, 1954.

[121] As used here, "urbanization" connotes not only mere numerical increases in the population of cities but also the development of an urban way of life and the accompanying changes in value orientation (cf. Louis Wirth, "Urbanism as a Way of Life," *American Journal of Sociology*, July, 1938).

[2] Census data for Southeast Asia are notably incomplete. In Burma, Thailand, and the Associated States of Indochina the "urban" population is estimated to be little more than 10 per cent of the whole; in Indonesia still less; but in the Philippines some 24 per cent of the population is classified as urban; and in Malaya, including the Crown Colony of Singapore, about 35 per cent. Without Singapore, only 27 per cent of the Malayan population is classified as urban.

[113] [3] *United Nations Demographic Yearbook, 1952.*

162
369
361

significantly from the norm, with 18 per cent of its population living in large urban clusters. In the United States, on the other hand, nearly 30 per cent of the population lives in such large cities.

Southeast Asia retains many characteristics of a frontier region, with large areas of sparse population, and so it seems paradoxical that its population density is 95 per square mile, as compared with 50 in the United States, 23 in the Soviet Union, and 617 in Japan. Clearly there is no single correlation between densities and urbanization. The explanation lies in the structure of the urban hierarchy within the region. Whereas in the United States there is a notable gradation of cities from larger to smaller, and only 18 per cent of the urban population lives in cities of one million population or more, in Southeast Asia the urban population is most clearly associated with the largest cities. For example, in Thailand, half of the urban population lives in one metropolis, Bangkok, and the rest is distributed among a large number of smaller cities and towns, the largest of which contains no more than 35,000 people. Bangkok, therefore, may be regarded as a true Primate City, that is, a city with many times the population of the next largest city and a multiplicity of functions and attractions which give it dominance.[4] The Primate City is characteristic of the so-called "great cities" in Southeast Asia, with few exceptions.[5] Such are, in

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[4] Mark Jefferson, "The Law of the Primate City," *Geographical Review*, April, 1939.

[5] For an excellent description of several of these great cities upon which this paper is based in part see D. W. Fryer, "The 'Million City' in Southeast Asia," *Geographical Review*, October, 1953.

455B

17: Ginsburg E-4 (no date)1955 ALl Southeast Asia ALl

162
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361



Burma, Rangoon; in Thailand, Bangkok; in the Philippines, Manila; and in Malaya, Singapore. In Indochina, however, there are two major core regions, each with its regional capital, but Saigon is clearly dominant over Hanoi, which for reasons of population size alone must be regarded as a lesser city.[6] In Indonesia densely populated Java has two large cities, Jakarta and Surabaya, the first only twice the size of the second, but Jakarta is the Primate City, if less clearly than Bangkok or Rangoon. In each case, other than Indonesia, the Primate City is from five to ten times as large as the next largest city, and there is no such graded hierarchy of urbanization as in the United States and to a considerable degree in Western European countries and Japan. Secondary cities, such as Mandalay in Burma, Makassar and Jogjakarta in Indonesia, and Cebu in the Philippines, tend to be regional capitals subordinate to a great metropolis.

The rapid population growth of the six greatest metropolitan centers—Rangoon, Bangkok, Saigon, Manila, Singapore, and Jakarta—suggest that national urbanization may be proceeding as rapidly in Southeast Asia as in any other part of the world.[7] This may be true, but it can be argued also that the overwhelming dominance of the Primate City inhibits the growth of lesser cities and that the largest cities will expand more rapidly than the lesser ones.[8] There are in effect only a limited number of services to be performed by cities within a predominantly village and folk society, although it may be industrializing slowly, and the great cities continue to possess a virtual monopoly of these services. Thus, even as a society changes, new and increasingly complex functions tend to be performed by institutions

[6] According to the *Annuaire statistique du Vietnam, 1949–50*, the population of Hanoi was 216,900 in 1950. Its port, Haiphong, had a population of 146,000. The total population of the two is only about one-fifth that of the twin cities of Saigon-Cholon.

[7] Between 1939 and 1948 the population of Greater Manila increased by 55 per cent. Between 1931 and 1947 the population of Singapore Town (now City) increased by 52.5 per cent.

17: Ginsburg E-4 (no date) 1955
ALI Southeast Asia ALI

already established in the Primate cities. So, to a very large degree, in Southeast Asia growth is primarily in the great cities,[9] whereas in the United States in the last three decades at least growth has been more rapid in the small and intermediate cities.

Although the rates of urbanization are high, being, in the case of the Philippines nearly twice the rate of population growth,[10] no sudden transformation to an urbanized society can be envisaged. The percentage of total population classified as urban is in general so low and the normal rates of population increase so high that the growth of urban population *as a percentage of total population* has not been spectacular. In the Philippines, for example, the urban population increased merely from 23.3 per cent in 1939 to 24.1 per cent in 1948, largely in the Manila area. The apparent positive correlation between social change and rates of urban population growth also is exceptionally high. To illustrate with a negative example, in Thailand, where recent social change has been minimal, the rapid population growth of Bangkok has been equaled and even exceeded by that of a number of rural *changwats* in the central and southeastern parts of the country. Under at least two conditions, however, the great cities have increased their populations enormously and at shocking rates: (1) where enlarged political functions have been acquired since the war and (2) where rural unrest and insecurity have

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[9] The only apparent major exception to this generalization is Singapore and Malaya, where the lesser towns have tended to increase their populations equally rapidly since 1931. This situation may be explained by the special political and economic status of Singapore, the entrepôt for much of archipelagic Southeast Asia, and the exceptional degree of commercialization in the Malayan economy as a whole (see M. V. del Tufo, *A Report on the 1947 Census of Population [Malaya, Comprising the Federation of Malaya and the Colony of Singapore]* [London, 1949]).

[9] E.g., Greater Manila accounted for 89 per cent of the 1939–48 growth of the seven largest cities in the Philippines.

[10] Between 1939 and 1948 the approximate rate of total population growth was 20 per cent; that of urban population growth, nearly 40 per cent.

17: Ginsburg E-4 (no date) 1955
All Southeast Asia All

caused or hastened a flight to the relative security of the city. These forces have been operating in combination particularly in Rangoon, Jakarta, Saigon, and Manila and largely are responsible for their extremely rapid postwar growth. Lesser cities in Java, for example, such as Surabaya, Jogjakarta, Semarang, and Surakarta, also have increased in population because of rural insecurity; and in Burma in several towns and cities up to 50 per cent of the population has been resident less than four years, for the same reasons. These migrations have not, however, necessarily been accompanied by greater employment opportunities and consequently cannot be regarded as indexes of more rapid urbanization and associated socioeconomic change.

The great cities of Southeast Asia possess many features in common, not the least of which is their youth. This quality they share also with several of the great cities of the United States, but there the resemblance ceases.[11] In 1800 Rangoon, Saigon, and Singapore did not yet exist in city form; Bangkok, the new capital of Thailand, was less than twenty years old; Manila and Batavia (Jakarta), though then about two hundred years old, were merely small coastal towns. They began to grow rapidly after the middle of the nineteenth century, as a consequence of the development of the treaty ports in China, the opening of Japan, the transfer of power from the East India Company to the British Crown by the Queen's Proclamation of 1858, the opening of the

[11] For the most part the growth of the Southeast Asian cities was not associated with a total transformation of society but with a strong indigenous tradition, as in the case of Bangkok, or with the juxtaposition of a segment of a new civilization alongside the old, as in the case of Rangoon. In America the cities represented the culmination of a social transformation in a virtually unoccupied frontier region. The same is true of Manchuria, the northeastern frontier of pioneer settlement in China, which is more recently, and more highly, urbanized than any other part of China. In Manchuria, as in the United States, there is a quite regular gradation of city sizes, and the Primate City cannot be clearly identified.

17: Ginsburg E-4 (no date) 1955
ALl Southeast Asia ALl

Suez Canal in 1869, and the consolidation of Western control, direct or indirect, over most of Southeast Asia in the 1890's, followed by American acquisition of the Philippines at the turn of the century.

More important, the great cities were, and to a large degree still are, foreign creations, essentially alien to the Southeast Asian landscape. Although several began as native settlements, they developed as foreign exclaves on the margins of Asia, in much the same way as did the plantation system and mining operations. With the exception of Bangkok, they represented and functioned as the overseas appendages of Western, not indigenous, interests, being what Spate has called "head-links"—the gates by which Western concepts entered to destroy and build and in which a new system of economic organization evolved.[12] Indeed, the concept of the Asian plural society was inspired by the contrast between the basically foreign great city and the indigenous agricultural village. The ties of the great city with its hinterland were primarily commercial and associated with foreign-controlled mining and plantation interests and with Chinese-dominated rice trade. Such direct political-administrative ties as did exist were restricted primarily to indigenous elites, small in number, which allied themselves with Western interests. Where the indigenous rural populations were affected by these urban-rural relations, it was primarily through the plantation or the mining system, both of which needed a large labor force, or through Indian or Chinese intermediaries.

On the other hand, the relations between an indigenous capital, like Bangkok in its earlier period, or Kyoto or Peking, and the agrarian society upon which it was based were of quite a different order. In these cases the capital represented the culmination of what might be termed a national *ethos*, the epitome of what Redfield has

[12] O. H. K. Spate, "Factors in the Development of Capital Cities," *Geographical Review*, October, 1942, p. 628.

458A

called the "Great Tradition" in an agrarian society.[13]

The links between country and city in this basically feudal relationship were clear, consecutive, and relatively simple to define. To be sure, the villager would regard the capital as a different world from his own, but it was nevertheless a largely comprehensible world, if associated with abstractions and refinements beyond his immediate ken.[14] The modern great city of Southeast Asia, however, not only was different but was also incomprehensible to the child of the folk society, who came to regard it not merely as strange and foreign but also as hostile. The "foreignness" is reflected in their ethnic composition. Until the second World War at least the largest population group in Rangoon was Indian; Singapore is primarily a Chinese city; Bangkok is very largely Chinese, as is Saigon if Cholon, its twin city, is included; both Manila and Jakarta have large foreign and Chinese elements. To this extent the great city is more metropolitan than national. Each has its Chinese, European, and native quarters, for example, although in many instances the lines of division have become blurred, especially since the close of the war.[15] Furthermore, wherever Chinese populations are large, a predominant type of house is the so-called "shophouse," a two-or-more-story building with shops on the first floor, built to a standard width originally dictated by the length of the average fir-log lintel as used in South China, and with residential flats and

[13] See Robert Redfield and Milton Singer, "A Cultural Role of Cities," a working paper for the Conference on the Role of Cities in Economic Growth and Cultural Change, University of Chicago, May 24–26, 1954.

[14] Cf. J. M. van der Kroef, "The Indonesian City: Its Culture and Evolution," *Asia*, March, 1953.

[15] In Singapore the Chinese are localised according to the various so-called "clans," e.g., Hokkien, Cantonese, Tiuchiu, Hailams, and Hakka (see B. W. Hodder, "Racial Groupings in Singapore," *Malayan Journal of Tropical Geography*, October, 1953).

THE GREAT CITY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

342 cubicles behind and above.[16] Usually con-
347 structed in continuous rows and back to
back, this type of tenement is among the
563 more conspicuous evils in Southeast Asian
cities. On the urban peripheries and wher-
● 369 ever interstices appear in the modern street
184 and housing pattern, slum villages appear
which consist of house clusters usually con-
structed of bamboo and *atap* palm, highly
inflammable and unsanitary.[17] These also
are found in and on the margins of the lesser
cities but are most striking in juxtaposition
to the sleek boulevards of Singapore, Bang-
kok, and Jakarta.

184 A further index of the cultural and eco-
369 nomic pluralism of the great cities is their
361 frequent division into old and new towns.
In China, especially in the treaty ports, this
distinction is usually between an old Chinese
and a modern foreign city. The same is true
of India. In Southeast Asia the contrast is
most often between an old and a modern
town both of Western origin, as in Jakarta,
Manila, Singapore, and Rangoon. To a not-
able degree each of these is also a planned
city. In Saigon the contrast is between pre-
dominantly Chinese Cholon and Saigon it-
self. In Bangkok, however, there are the old
Siamese castle town, a new town of indig-
enous origin, though of European design,
and a Chinese town or quarter nearly as old
as the castle town itself. Pluralism is seen
not merely in the division of a city into old
and new parts or into quarters but also in
the separation of the predominantly out-
ward-oriented great city from an up-coun-

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[16] For a description of the "shophouse" see R. H. Hughes, "Hong Kong: An Urban Study," *Geographical Journal*, March, 1951, pp. 9–10.

[17] These areas, the so-called "kampongs," are historically enclaves of the countryside within the city. They form small social cells which together cover most of the surface area in and on the margins of the great cities. Separately, they constitute the rural villages, which in the densely settled portions of Java, for example, are so closely spaced that they collectively exhibit population densities as high as those in many cities (see photographs in J. M. Fraser, "Town Planning and Housing in Singapore," *Town Planning Review*, January, 1953).

459A

17: Ginsburg E-4 (no date) 1955
All Southeast Asia All

try, indigenous, cultural or political subcenter. Just as Shanghai had its Nanking and Peking, so Rangoon has its Mandalay, Jakarta its Jogjakarta, Manila its Cebu, and, in a variant form, Singapore its Kuala Lumpur.

In the past these cities sited along the Asian littoral have been the funnels through which produce from the interiors have reached tidewater and the world of commerce and Western manufactures have penetrated. Through the increasingly metropolitan channels have flowed the ideas of the West as well as its material goods. In a sense they have acted both as a catalyst for social and economic change and as a cushion which modified the shock of the earlier cultural contacts.

With the exception of Singapore, the site of each of the great cities of Southeast Asia is an ill-drained riverine or coastal lowland strategically placed in relation to an exceptionally productive agricultural region. Again, with the exception of Singapore, none possesses a deep natural harbor suitable for modern ocean-going shipping. The three mainland ports are both river and ocean ports and must be reached through tortuous and shallow river channels. All are entrepôts. Jakarta and Manila are located on the most highly developed islands of the archipelagoes, for which they act as entrepôts. Only in Indonesia and Indochina are there major competitors for the two greatest ports —Haiphong, the outlet for the densely populated Tonkin delta, and Surabaya, the regional capital for the Great East of the Indies, itself an empire. Each great port virtually dominates the national import trade; all tend, however, to share some part of the national export trade with lesser ports. In spite of these great similarities, the nature and functions of the ports differ markedly. As Allen observes: "All ports are individual. History, geography, politics, and economics all contribute to making them as they are. Few universal principles apply, and attempts to force uniformity on ports which have grown up differently are bound to tail."[18] Singapore, for example, is one of the

On the other hand, changes in transportation have elevated Bangkok to a new importance. It lies astride the main air route between Europe and the Far East, and the Australia-Europe services also pass through it. It is now the leading international air center in Southeast Asia, with 42 international departures a week in 1953 as compared with Singapore's 27, and its airport is one of the larger commercial fields in the Orient.

The role of the Southeast Asian great city has been modified by the Pacific war and the granting of independence to Burma, the Philippines, and Indonesia, and partial independence to Vietnam. Five of the six great cities are now capitals of the independent states. Each of these merits the title "link capital"; that is, they are the media through which the newly independent states are linked with the outside world. At the same time, they have begun to assume an increasingly indigenous character. The substitution of Malay for Dutch names and street signs in Indonesia is only one evidence of cultural change. The in-migration of petty officials, tradesmen, and refugees from the beleaguered rural areas has given the urban populations a new and more homogeneous native cast. The fevers of nationalism have made the large minorities more cautious about flaunting their ethnic independence.

! [i.e. as compared to the inconvenient port facilities -- Analyst]

17: Ginsburg E-4 (no date) 1955
ALl Southeast Asia ALl

361 On the other hand, the war also brought in-
178 creased American influence into the region,
631 and the ubiquitous Coca-Cola sign is one of
184 the symbols of change that sooner or later
will be followed by changes in urban facili-
162 ties and urban organization.

More important, the present period is as-
563 sociated with an increasing intensification of
171 the economic activities of government and a
corresponding diminution of foreign enter-
•369 prise. Political and administrative functions
have become increasingly important since
the war. Since the main governmental or-
gans are concentrated in the largest centers,
the direct influence of the great city upon
the country in which it is primate is likewise
increasing. Relations between nationalized
city and an increasingly money-oriented
countryside are becoming more intimate,
and the formerly clear-cut cultural distinc-
tiveness of city and country is rapidly be-
coming blurred. Therefore, the likelihood of
the great city's leading a revival of ancient
value systems, as some extreme ethnocen-
trists hope it will, is small. Only one predic-
tion can be made: the days of the culturally
alien and ethnically distinct urban center
are numbered in Southeast Asia; and a city
like Singapore becomes increasingly an
anomalous relict of an age now past.

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